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One of the main objectives of this paper is to show the dynamics that
relates inequality, social capital and institutions. The most important
result is that these dynamics could generate multiple equilibria. Thus,
we can identify two types of equilibriums: one with a low level of social
capital and high level of inequality, supported by institutions created en-
dogenously by the community; and on the other hand, an equilibrium
with a high level of social capital, low inequality and institutions that
favor social equality.
The analysis made in this paper can be seen as a contribution to
the literature on why a society may attain high levels of institutional
development and social integration.
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1 Introduction
In the last years, economic theory has demonstrated an increasing interest in
the social capital concept. This is re￿ ected in the growing number of papers
related to this topic. However, the economic literature shows a high degree of
￿For helpful comments I am very grateful to Fernando TohmØ. The usual disclaimer applies.
1disagreement about the de￿nition of social capital, since it is very di¢ cult to
deal with this notion in empirical studies. That￿ s why the di⁄erent de￿nitions
tend to be extremely broad, producing ambiguities in the treatment of this
subject. In this paper we will adopt a de￿nition of social capital that minimizes
the ambiguities in the subsequent analysis. Thus, this will allow us to continue
with the development of the paper under a clear conception of what is social
capital.
Once we de￿ne social capital, we will analize the relationship between
this concept, inequality and institutions. It is important to mention that, in
general, the economic literature has studied these subjects separately. For that
reason, one of the objectives of this paper is to treat all these subjects jointly
and to show how they are intimately related.
We believe that a deeper understanding of all these subjects help to
explain, at least in part, why a given society has attained a certain level of
development. In this sense, this paper can be seen as a contribution towards
this explanation.
Section 2 includes a very brief review of the social capital, inequality and
institutions literature, with a special emphasis in the social capital de￿nition.
Section 3 discusses the dynamics that relates these concepts. Section 4 presents
a model that formalizes all the previous discussion. And in the last section we
present the conclusions of the paper.
2 Theoretical Discussion
2.1 What is Social Capital?
If we review all the social capital literature one of the main conclusions that
we can draw is that di⁄erent authors have di⁄erent views about what is social
capital. As a result, there exists a great variety of de￿nitions of social capital
in the literature. Even more, there are points of view such as Manski (2000)
that questions the introduction of this notion into economics, since he argues
that we can explain the economic reality using the core concepts of preferences,
expectations, constraints and equilibrium without the need of a new concept.
In this paper we propose to associate social capital with social interac-
tions. In this sense, we do not intend to introduce this concept as a core one, but
just as a mere object of study. Since the bene￿ts of doing so are very important
because it has signi￿cant in￿ uences over other areas of economics.
Consequently, we de￿ne social capital as a system of interpersonal net-
works (Dasgupta, 2001). This de￿nition is very clear and de￿nes exactly the
2object of study. In general, other authors give broader and ambiguous de￿ni-
tions, that tend to include institutions, trust, etc. (see for example: Coleman,
1990; Durlauf and Fafchamps, 2004; Portes, 1998).
The generation of social capital could cause bene￿cial and negative con-
sequences. In the literature there exists a general bias towards stressing the
importance of the bene￿cial consequences of social capital. Even more, these
bene￿cial e⁄ects are included in the de￿nition of social capital. Consequently,
this approach introduces a circular reasoning of the type: a group is successful
because it has social capital but the evidence that the group has social capital is
its success (Portes, 1998; Durlauf, 1999; Sobel, 2002). That is why Durlauf and
Fafchamps (2004) argument that we should not recommend policies that con-
tribute to the formation of social capital until we know under what conditions
social capital generates positive consequences. The same authors remark that
the works which attribute every conceivable societal virtue to social capital like
Putnam (2000) have little prospect of having lasting social science value (see
also: Sobel, 2002).
From this argumentation one of the main questions that have to be
answered is: what incentives has an agent to form a social network with other
agents? In other words: what are the causes of social capital?
2.2 The Formation of Social Capital
Dasgupta (2005) intends to explain why agents form and maintain social net-
works. This author recognizes that agents are born in social networks, which
they inherit. From these networks they choose to maintain some of them and
discard the others. On the other hand, they not only inherit social networks
but also they choose to enter into new ones.
The decision of creating a link between two agents can be made jointly
or individually. Each connection has associated costs; furthermore, it is also
costly to maintain them. Dasgupta argues that in some contexts these costs are
like transaction costs. Furthermore, the individuals decide to invest in a social
network because it generates a utility in one of the agents or in both of them.
On the other hand, Bala and Goyal (2000) develop a model where each
individual is a source of bene￿ts that others can obtain through the creation of
costly pairwise links. The costs associated with the formation of links are only
faced by the agent who initiates the link. In this way, these authors de￿ne a
non cooperative game of network formation. And as a result, they obtain that
there are some network structures that arise as equilibria of this non cooperative
game, particularly star, circular, etc.
3Blume and Durlauf (2000) present a di⁄erent manner of approaching
social interactions, by analyzing individual decisions in a context of social in-
teractions. They combine random choice models with externalities models, and
focus on population behavior. Their model is highly nonlinear and has multiple
steady states, showing that individual decisions have a very weak in￿ uence on
the population behavior. The aim of the paper of Blume and Durlauf is not to
explain why agents form social networks, but instead to explain the population
behavior. In the context of our discussion this is very important since it allows
us to analyze the process of social network formation taking into consideration
that each individual decision is not very important in that process.
The point of view of these authors is to treat ￿...aggregate socioeco-
nomic behavior as a statistical regularity of the collection of individual decisions
as they are determined through the interactions and idiosyncratic characteris-
tics of the agents￿(Blume and Durlauf, 2000). Therefore, it won￿ t be necessary
the individual behavior to model in such detail as in the traditional economic
models. The agents make decisions considering their payo⁄s, but these decisions
have a random component. Consequently, these kind of models ￿... typically
specify an explicit probability measure characterizing individual behavior con-
ditional on exogenous (to the individual) characteristics which can be either
common to all members of the population or individual-speci￿c, and an interac-
tion structure which speci￿es who a⁄ects whom. The goal of the analysis is to
characterize a joint probability measure over all agents in the population that is
compatible with these conditional probability measures￿(Blume and Durlauf,
2000).
Glaeser et. al. (2000) establish a di⁄erent viewpoint on the issue of
social capital formation. Their analysis uses a model of individual decision in-
vestment very similar to standard models of investment in physical or human
capital. They also consider the individual social capital as the social compo-
nent of the human capital (for example: personal charisma is social capital).
In addition, they de￿ne the aggregated social capital as a function of all the
di⁄erent types of individual social capital. This de￿nition is not compatible
with the de￿nition that we have chosen, even though it is important to discuss
their model since it is one of the ￿rst attempts to explicitly formalize the social
capital idea.
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this solution means that social capital investment rises with the discount
factor, rises with the occupational returns to social skills, increases in commu-
nities with more aggregate social capital, and rises when social capital is less
community speci￿c; and on the other hand, declines with mobility, with the
opportunity cost of time, with the rate of depreciation and with age.
The analogy between physical capital and social capital has received
many critiques in the literature (Dasgupta, 2001; Sobel, 2002). Sobel (2002)
argues that we have to distinguish between costly social capital and the social
capital that comes without sacri￿ce. For example, the ￿rst language and the
ethnicity are acquired without calculation or sacri￿ce. However, Sobel declares
that the costly social capital is in proportion signi￿cant enough to be worthy of
study. On the other hand, he indicates that a di⁄erence between social capital
and physical capital is that social capital appreciates with the use.
According to our de￿nition of social capital, the paper of Alesina and
La Ferrara (2000) presents a model that is compatible with our point of view.
In this work the authors study the in￿ uence of the population heterogeneity
on the process of group formation and on the level of individual participation.
The agents obtain utility directly from the interaction with other individuals
and prefer to interact with those that are similar to them in terms of income
and ethnicity. Furthermore, if we suppose that the preferences are correlated
with those characteristics a proposition arises indicating that individuals prefer
to interact with those that have similar preferences. In the model it is assumed
that the entry into a group is costless, there are no congestion e⁄ects, there are
no economies of scale, and there exist free entry and exit of individuals into the
group. There are two types of individuals, whites and blacks, their size being
W > 0 and B > 0. The population is uniformely distributed on a line, and
both types have a uniform distribution on the interval [0,1]. Then the utility
from participation for an individual of the type j = W;B located at a distance
5l from the location of the group1 is:
Uj = u(￿;P￿j) + v (l) for j = B;W (4)
where: P￿j is the proportion of group members whose type is di⁄erent from
j￿ s type, ￿ is a taste indicator that varies across agents and captures the intensity
of an agent￿ s aversion to the opposite race, u￿ (￿) < 0; up (￿) < 0 and vl (￿) < 0.
And the authors make the following assumptions: u￿p (￿) ￿ 0, u￿ (￿)jP=0 = 0
and up (￿)j￿=0 = 0.
According to this model an individual may decide to participate in a
group if the utility is greater than the reservation utility and also if it is greater
than the utility of joining a di⁄erent group (in the case that more than one group
exists). An equilibrium in the case of an equilibrium with one group is de￿ned as
￿...a group composition (P￿
B;P￿
W) such that for both types none of the members
wishes to leave the group and none of the nonmembers wishes to join￿ . And
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none of the members wishes to leave
the group and none of the nonmembers wishes to join￿ . The aggregate level of
participation is the percentage of the population that belongs to a group2.
The main conclusion of this model is that an increase in the degree of
population heterogeneity decreases the aggregate level of participation.
2.3 Social Capital and Inequality
In the previous section we showed that inequality is an important factor that
determines the level of social capital in a population. There are di⁄erent pa-
pers that verify the existence of a negative relation between social capital and
inequality. In this section we comment some of them.
Before continuing, it is important to remark that in many of these stud-
ies the variables used to capture the level of social capital may not be rigorously
compatible with the de￿nition used in our paper. One of the principal problems
of these empirical papers is that it is very complex to obtain a variable that
represents without ambiguities the social capital.
1If the travelling costs were not included in the model it would be no reason to form mixed
groups, likewise, it would be no reason to form more than two groups since there are no
congestion costs.
2To simplify the model the authors suppose that each individual can participate only in
one group.
6In the paper of Alesina and La Ferrara (2000) using survey data on group
membership and data on U.S. localities and controlling for many individual
characteristics they ￿nd that participation in social activities is signi￿cantly
lower in those localities that have a higher level of inequality.
On the other hand, Knack and Keefer (1997) ￿nd in a study realized
with data collected from 29 economies during the 1980-1992 period that trust
and civic norms are stronger in those countries with higher incomes and with
more equal income distribution.
Costa and Kahn (2001), in their work about the declination of social
capital in the U.S., conclude that income inequality explains this phenomenon.
Particularly, they indicate that income inequality is the cause of the declination
of social capital outside households, since the authors di⁄erentiate between the
social capital centered in the community and in the home.
The following section introduces the institutions to our analysis.
2.4 Institutions
Dasgupta (2001) in an attempt to delimit social capital argues￿ ... that to iden-
tify social capital with institutions is a mistake: institutions emerge from net-
works, they are themselves not the networks￿ . Therefore, he argues that insti-
tutions are a product of the social capital.
In the same way, Knight (1992) says that social institutions are prevalent
wherever individuals attempt to live and work together. They are produced by
individuals attempting to take care of every aspect of their life.
North (1990) identi￿es the institutions with the rules of the game in
a society. In this way, we can say that institutions delimit the choice set of
the individuals. Consequently, they structure the incentives in every human
exchange, political, social or economical. North classi￿es institutions into formal
institutions ￿like the rules that individuals create ￿and informal institutions ￿
like conventions or codes of conduct. These institutions can be created like, for
example a Constitution, or they simply arise through time like, for example a
certain convention in a community.
Knight (1992) argues that informal institutions are very important be-
cause they form the base for the intentional development of formal institutions.
He says that ￿...these informal conventions form the base on which a vast range
of formal institutions organize and in￿ uence economic and political life￿ .
North (1990) in his work refers to institutional change and argues that
entrepreneurs are the agents of change. He says that they respond to incentives
generated by the institutional structure. In this way, he states that changes of
7relative prices and changes in preferences are the source of institutional change.
Additionally, he argues that informal institutions may evolve without the requi-
site that the change is produced by organizations or by individuals that want to
explicitly reformulate these institutions. On the other hand, a change in formal
institutions will require that organizations or individuals declare how they want
to reformulate them because this change may depend on the use of abundant
resources or on a mechanism that minimizes the problem of free-riding.
Institutional change can be seen as an evolving process that is continu-
ous, especially if we focus our attention on the development of informal institu-
tions. Nevertheless North (1990) points out in some examples that there exist
discontinuous institutional changes like, wars, revolutions and natural disasters.
Acemoglu (2004) classi￿es the di⁄erent existing points of view on in-
stitutions into four categories. They are: the e¢ cient institutions view (the
society will choose the institutions that maximize its total surplus), the inciden-
tal institutions view (the institutions are a product of other social interactions),
the rent-seeking institutions view (the institutions emerge as a result of choices
made by individuals, but they are not necessarily e¢ cient), and the costly in-
stitutions view (the institutions are created for solving economic problems and
there is a tendency towards e¢ cient institutions, but this view recognizes that
it might be costly to design the right institutions).
What distinguishes the e¢ cient institutions view from the other three is
that in this view di⁄erent institutions do not produce di⁄erent results, they only
produce di⁄erent economic environments. This point of view assumes that there
are not transaction costs, i.e. that Coase￿ s Theorem is satis￿ed. That￿ s why the
economic results are independent of the di⁄erent institutional arrangements. In
what follows we will suppose that institutions are an important determinant of
the economic result. In addition, we can say that the incidental institution view
is the most compatible with our line of thought in this work.
2.5 Social Capital and Institutions
In the previous section we indicated that Dasgupta (2001) proposed a relation
between social capital and institutions, in the sense that institutions are a prod-
uct of the social networks. In that work Dasgupta argues that social networks
(social capital) produce multiple equilibria and that each equilibrium is char-
acterized by a di⁄erent institutional structure. Therefore, this author has in
mind a vision rather di⁄erent from the e¢ cient institutions view, in which each
equilibrium derived from the social capital will generate a di⁄erent institutional
arrangement and thus a di⁄erent economic result.
8However, the institutions are not only a product of the social capital but
also the social capital is shaped by the institutional arrangement, since the social
networks are embedded in social institutions. In this sense, one can propose
a system where social capital and institutions modify each other, building a
virtuous or vicious cycle if the dynamics generates a ￿desirable￿or ￿undesirable￿
equilibrium, respectively.
In previous sections we mentioned that the social capital literature has
a bias toward emphasizing on the positive results generated by social capital. A
broader vision should consider the possibility that social capital also generates
undesirable results. Continuing with our logic, this translates into the possibility
that social capital may generate ￿good￿or ￿bad￿institutions.
In the following section we will concentrate in one of the e⁄ects of in-
stitutions on the economy, namely on inequality.
2.6 Institutions and Inequality
Knight (1992) remarks that many of the principal e⁄ects of institutions on
a given society are of distributional nature. This is because institutions do
not produce collective bene￿ts but instead they yield di⁄erentiated bene￿ts.
Therefore, he argues that it is possible that they may generate social con￿ icts.
In this sense, he adds that there is more than one form to structure social
institutions with the aim of obtaining bene￿ts from cooperation, coordination
and the exchange that they generate. But the aspect to remark is that these
di⁄erent institutional arrangements will produce di⁄erent distributive e⁄ects,
since the bene￿ts they generate will be distributed di⁄erently in one or in other
institutional system.
According to this point of view, there are not e¢ cient or ine¢ cient
institutions, instead there are institutions that generate di⁄erent distributions.
Social institutions a⁄ect the distribution of the bene￿ts generated by the numer-
ous interactions that constitute the social life of the society. For that reason,
rational individuals would seek to establish those institutions that produce a
distribution of bene￿ts pro￿table for them. Nevertheless, one can argue that
there are some institutional arrangements that produce distributional e⁄ects
that minimize social con￿ icts. In this sense, we say that there exists a set of
institutions that generates ￿good￿results. Acemoglu et. al. (2005) say: ￿...we
think of good economic institutions as those that provide security of property
right and relative equal access to economic resources to a broad cross-section of
society￿ .
In spite of his concentration on the distributional consequences of insti-
tutions, Knight does not neglect the importance that they have to the coordi-
9nation and cooperation in a given society. The crucial point that he observes is
that coordination and cooperation are not useful for explaining why institutions
are created or why they change. Instead they are a mere product of the search
of bene￿ts by individuals.
Based on the previous section, we can argue that of the multiple equi-
libria that are generated by social capital some of them could be ￿desirable￿in
the sense that they generate institutions that minimize social con￿ icts.
Robinson and Sokolo⁄ (2003) reveal a relationship between institutions
and income inequality. In their explanation of the level of income inequality
in Latin America, they indicate the critical level of income inequality of this
region during the colonial period. These authors compare Latin America with
North America, and they say that North America began as a colony with low
level of inequality and this situation lead to the establishment of egualitarian
institutions. On the other hand, in Latin America the level of inequality was
very important and the institutions that were established tended to perpetuate
and accentuate this inequality. In the rest of this work we present a relationship
between inequality and institutions, and then a converse relationship between
institutions and inequality.
3 The Dynamics among Inequality, Social Cap-
ital and Institutions
3.1 Towards a Formal Model
According to the discussion outlined previously it seems that inequality, social
capital and institutions are intimately related. Since that on one hand a rela-
tionship between inequality and social capital has been proposed, on the other
hand it exists an established a connection between social capital and institu-
tions, other works postulate a relationship between institutions and inequality,
and others also established an association between inequality and institutions.
The hypothesis that we propose in this paper is that there is a circu-
lar dynamics between these concepts, since income inequality3 has an e⁄ect on
social capital, the latter creates or changes institutions, and institutions have
an e⁄ect on income distribution, and so on until one equilibrium is reached.
In equilibrium, the individuals do not have incentives to modify the institu-
tional arrangement, and therefore the income distribution does not receive any
alteration.
3To simplify we suppose that all the heterogeneity in the population is captured in the
income distribution of the population.
10It could be possible that this dynamic may have multiple equilibria.
To reach a particular equilibrium would depend on the initial level of income
inequality. In this way, we can di⁄erentiate two types of equilibria: those cor-
responding to high levels of income inequality, with inegualitarian institutions
and a low interaction between individuals; and those of low income inequality,
with institutions that promote a more egualitarian income distribution and a
strong social cohesion.
Acemoglu et. al. (2005) propose a dynamic that is very similar to ours. In
their own words they say: ￿...we showed that at any date, political power is
shaped by political institutions, which determine de jure power, and the inher-
ited distribution of resources, which a⁄ect the balance of de facto power. Po-
litical power then determines economic institutions and economic performance.
It also in￿ uences the future evolution of political power and prosperity. Eco-
nomic institutions determine the distribution of resources at that point, which,
in turn, in￿ uences the distribution of de facto power in the future. Similarly, the
distribution of power at any point determines not just the economic institutions
then, but also the future political institutions. Thus the allocation of political
power at one date, because of the way it in￿ uences the distribution of resources
and future political institutions, has a crucial e⁄ect on the future allocation of
both de facto and de jure political power￿ .
3.2 Path-dependence
According to the previous discussion, one can think that there is a critical initial
level of income inequality and that the ￿goodness￿ of the proposed dynamic
depends on it. In this way, if the initial level of income inequality is above the
critical one the dynamics will converge on an equilibrium with high inequality,
while, if the initial level of income inequality is below the system will attain an
egualitarian equilibrium.
This dynamics make the outcome signi￿cantly dependent on the initial
conditions and the path followed by the system. In connection with this, North
(1990) argues that institutional change, which is fundamental in the social and
economical evolution, is path-dependent. On the other hand, Young (1998)
in his evolutionary analysis of institutions develops games that represent the
evolution of institutions. In those games, that evolution depends on processes
that attain di⁄erent results depending on the path followed by the system (path-
dependence), in that context these processes are denominated non-ergodic. In
those terms our equilibria are path-dependent or non-ergodic.
113.3 The Assumptions
The dynamic proposed above depends on assuming that social capital produces
some particular results. No theory speci￿es under which conditions the social
capital generates ￿good￿consequences. We suppose that under low inequality
conditions the social capital will generate egualitarian institutions.
The logic is the following. In t=0 if the level of inequality is not im-
portant (it is below the critical level) then it will stimulate the formation of
more social interactions, and we expect that this social capital generates more
egualitarian institutions. Consequently, this initial level of inequality will gen-
erate institutions that induce the production of more social capital, the latter
will generate more egualitarian institutions, and so on until one equilibrium is
reached. On the other hand, and in the same way, we can think of a dynamic
that starts in a level of income inequality above the critical one. In such a
case we suppose that the social capital generated will create institutions that
emphasize inequality.
It is important to remark that this assumption has an economic logic.
Since that individuals prefer to interact with those that are similar to them, if
the population is very heterogeneous they will form many social groups that have
di⁄erent interests4, and therefore, this heterogeneity will produce a fragmented
society. The ensuring social fragmentation and the variety of interests will
produce coordination problems. These coordination problems will be translated
into institutions that induce more inequality. On the other hand, if we think
in a homogeneous society, the individuals will form a small number of groups5
and in that way, a cohesive society. As a result, the institutions created in that
context will generate positive consequences for the whole community because we
can think this society as a single rational agent who chooses those institutions
that maximize her well being.
In this direction, Acemoglu et. al. (2005) argue that di⁄erent groups and
individuals bene￿t from di⁄erent economic institutions. The groups and indi-
viduals that bene￿t from these institutional arrangements are those that have
greater political power, and this power is determined by political institutions and
the distribution of resources. This explains why when there exists an important
level of heterogeneity in the population those groups that are best positioned on
the income distribution are those that are going to be bene￿ted from the insti-
tutional arrangement. This situation will cause in turn more inequality because
these groups will choose the economic institutions that maximize their own ben-
e￿t. On the other hand, we could think a more equal society as a society where
the groups have similar resources and the political power is distributed equally
between them. Thus the distribution of institutional bene￿ts will be equal too.
4We suppose that there are not collective action problems inside the groups.
5We suppose that each individual can only participate in one group.
124 The Model
4.1 Inequality, Social Capital and Institutions
Consider a society populated by N individuals where each individual i 2 [0;N]
must decide between forming or not a group with other individuals. This deci-
sion will be based on the level of income inequality given in the population since
the individuals prefer to interact with those that are similar to them in terms
of income. If the inequality is not important then the individuals will tend to
form less and more numerous groups, since it is going to be more probable that i
will ￿nd other individuals with a similar income. On the other hand, in a more
unequal society the individuals will tend to focus on forming a larger quantity
of groups and therefore a more polarized society.
In this model we suppose that there are not social protests, revolutions
or civil wars that can produce any discontinuous institutional change. In other
words, we assume that there are not con￿ ict groups. To simplify the model we
also assume that each individual can only participate in one group and if the
individual decides not to participate in any group then she will be considered
as a group by herself.
Therefore, if G is the quantity of groups in the population then G 2 [1;N].
Where G = 1 corresponds to an extremely integrated society and G = N is the
result of a completely polarized society.
We de￿ne c = G
N as the social capital, where c ! 0 is a high social
capital and c ! 1 is a low one. We assume that N ! 1, therefore when
G = 1, c ’ 0. The social capital depends on the level of income inequality
since G = g(￿) where ￿ is an inequality index like, for example the Gini index,




The dynamics of institutions are re￿ ected in a function that maps the social
capital onto the income inequality. Based on our previous discussion, the so-
cial capital produce institutions and the latter modify the income distribution.
Therefore, ￿ = I(c) where I(￿) is a continuous function and we also assume
that I(0) = 0 and I(1) = 1 since we consider that a high social capital (low c)
generates low inequality (low ￿), and vice versa.
4.2 The Equilibrium
The equilibrium can be represented by the following ￿gure (￿gure 1):
13Figure 1
where ￿
￿ and c￿ are the equilibrium values of the income inequality index
and social capital, respectively.
To understand this representation it is helpful to analyze the dynamics
of the model. In ￿gure 2, we depart from ￿
0 which is the level of income
inequality that individuals see at t=0. Based on ￿
0 they reach a level c0 of
social capital. As a result, with c0 they generate institutions that modify the
income distribution reaching ￿
1. And so on until they reach the equilibrium.
Figure 2
14Proposition 1 Given f(￿) and I(￿) continuous functions with domain D 2 [0;1]
and image Im ￿ [0;1], with I(0) = 0 and I(1) = 1 ) an equilibrium exists.
Proof. Since that f(0) ￿ 0 and that f(1) ￿ 1, and given that I(0) = 0 and that
I(1) = 1 ) f(￿) and I(￿) must coincide at least in one point by the intermediate
value theorem.
It is important to mention that it could be possible the existence of a con-
tinuum of equilibria in a part of the domain if the two functions instead of
cutting in one point, keep attached to each other in that part of the domain.
But this situation is not generic since a minimum perturbation will separate
both functions. Therefore we discard this possibility.
4.3 Stability and Instability of the Equilibrium
In a situation with three equilibria, as represented by ￿gure 3, we can observe
that the equilibrium in the middle is unstable while both equilibria at the ex-
tremes are stable. In this sense, we de￿ne the critical level on income inequality
￿
c as the level of income inequality that if a given society begins with an in-
equality above this level will reach an equilibrium with higher level of income
inequality and a lower level of social capital. On the other hand, if a given
population starts with an inequality below the critical level an equilibrium with
lower income inequality and a higher level of social capital will be reached.
Figure 3
15Proposition 2 Given f(￿) and I(￿) continuous functions with domain D 2 [0;1]
and image Im ￿ [0;1], with I(0) = 0 and I(1) = 1 ) stable equilibrium exists.
Proof. Since that f(0) ￿ 0 and that f(1) ￿ 1, and given that I(0) = 0 and
that I(1) = 1 ) f(￿) and I(￿) must coincide at least in one point. If they do
only in one interior point then f(￿) must cut I(￿) from above yielding a stable
equilibrium. Otherwise, as represented in ￿gure 4, there can exist a single stable
equilibrium at the point (0,0)6.
On the other hand if both functions coincide in more than one interior point
then one of the equilibria must be stable since f(￿) must necessarily cut I(￿)
from above in at least one of these points. There are also cases as represented
in ￿gure 5 where the stable equilibrium is the point (0,0) and ￿gure 6 where the
stable equilibrium is the point (1,1)7.
Figure 4
Figure 5
6This case is not generic since it is an extremely case of a totally cohesive society.
7Again these two cases are not generic.
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4.4 The Position and the Shape of the Curves and Some
Remarks on the E⁄ectiveness of Policies
We suppose that I(c) has the same form for all type of societies. The only
function that we assume to vary across communities is f(￿). The form and
position of this function depend on the aversion that the individuals of a given
society have to other individuals with di⁄erent incomes. In this sense, given
two societies with equal number of individuals, the society with more aversion
17to inequality will have a f1(￿) above the f2(￿) of a society with less aversion to
inequality because the former society forms more groups than the latter.
The ￿S￿shaped f(￿) in ￿gure 3 belongs to a kind of society that may
exhibit a low aversion to inequality in the case of low inequality and has a higher
aversion to inequality when inequality is more important.
Since the shape of the functions is assumed to be independent of any
kind of policy because on one hand I(c) is supposed to be the same for all
societies while on the other f(￿) is assumed to depend only on the aversion to
inequality, in this model any policy that intends to lock the society out from a
￿bad￿equilibrium will not be e⁄ective. This is because ￿... political choices
are made rationally and are endogenous to the structure of institutions, which
are themselves ultimately endogenous ...￿(Acemoglu et. al., 2005) so a society
that is trapped in an ￿undesired￿equilibrium can not e⁄ectively apply policies
that seek to change that situation.
This result is trivial when we are in a situation with one stable equi-
librium. In a situation with two stable equilibria, which is more probable in
reality, to lock the society out from the ￿bad￿equilibrium we will need a policy
that signi￿cantly lowers the inequality below the critical level. But this policy
will never be implemented because the political power resides with those groups
that are best positioned on the income distribution and are able to decide which
policies are going to be applied. Therefore, they will choose those policies that
tend to increment it or leave inequality unchanged instead of policies that sig-
ni￿cantly lower it. Perhaps, in very special situation they may opt for policies
that lower a little inequality but they do certainly not have any incentive to
keep a policy that continually lowers the inequality.
Constituted by quite similar individuals, in a ￿good￿equilibrium the
political power is distributed equally between the groups. Therefore, there are
not incentives to implement policies that increase the inequality.
In this sense, the only way in which a society can be moved to another
equilibrium is by an exogenous and discontinuous change in institutions caused
by, for example, a natural disaster which could drastically alter the income
distribution. This situation may be possible if the change in income distribution
is large enough to lead the society to another stable equilibrium if it exists.
Proposition 3 In generic situation with two stable equilibria the power groups
will lack incentives to apply policies to move the society towards the other equi-
librium.
Proof. If the society is situated in a ￿bad￿ equilibrium, it exhibits high in-
equality. Therefore, the political power belongs to those groups that are best
18positioned on the income distribution. They do not have incentives to perma-
nently implement policies that lower inequality that would deprive them from
the source of their power. In the case of two stable equilibria and a society
situated in a ￿good￿equilibrium, there are not incentives to put into practice
policies that increase the inequality since this could only respond to the will to
accumulate power in groups with fewer individuals. But since agents are quite
similar they do not have a form to coordinate such policies8.
5 Conclusions
In the model developed in this paper we determine under what circumstances
a society would reach an equilibrium with low or high inequality, with eguali-
tarian or inegualitarian institutions, and with low or high level of social capital.
We also illustrated under what circumstances social capital produces ￿good￿
consequences. And we showed that any policy aimed to conduct a society to
another equilibrium will be unsuccessful.
We believe that this paper helps to explain why Latin America compared
with North America is so di⁄erent in terms of institutions, income inequality
and social capital. As we have said in a previous section when we mentioned
the work of Robinson and Sokolo⁄(2003). In addition, we think that this paper
makes important contributions to the discussion made in the work of Acemoglu
et. al. (2005).
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